In the present paper we study systematically several consequence relations on the usual language of propositional intuitionistic logic that can be defined semantically by using Kripke frames and the same defining truth conditions for the connectives as in intuitionistic logic but without imposing some of the conditions on the Kripke frames that are required in the intuitionistic case. The logics so obtained are called subintuitionistic logics in the literature. We depart from the perspective of considering a logic just as a set of theorems and also depart from the perspective taken by Restall in that we consider standard Kripke models instead of models with a base point. We study the relations between subintuitionistic logics and modal logics given by the translation considered by Došen. Moreover, we classify the logics obtained according to the hierarchy considered in Abstract Algebraic Logic.
Introduction
The expression "subintuitionistic logic" is used in the literature (Restall [10] , Wansing [18] ) to refer to propositional logics in the propositional language with connectives ∧, ∨, → and propositional constant ⊥ that are defined semantically by using Kripke frames and the same defining truth conditions for the connectives as in intuitionistic logic but without imposing some of the conditions on the Kripke frames that are required in the intuitionistic case. For instance, one can dispense with the reflexivity of the relation R of the Kripke frames or with the transitivity or with the persistence (heredity) condition that requires that the valuations assign to the variables sets of points which are closed under R.
In the first section of [18] , Wansing argues very convincingly in favor of taking seriously these weakenings of the usual conditions imposed on Kripke frames for intuitionistic logic. His proposal is to consider the relation of a frame as describing a possible development of information states instead of an expansion of information states. This last interpretation provides the usual Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic. We address the reader to this paper.
To our knowledge, the first logic studied in the literature that is a subintuitionistic logic in the sense described above is the consequence relation Basic Propositional Logic introduced in 1981 in Visser [17] and Visser [16] . It is the local consequence relation of the Kripke models that are transitive and whose valuations are persistent. This logic was rediscovered in 1991 by Ruitenburg [11] . Recently it has aroused new interest. In [15] , Suzuki, Wolter, and Zakharyaschev prove, among several other facts, that the logic is not protoalgebraic, and in Ardeshir and Ruitenburg [1] and [2] , Ruitenburg [12] , Suzuki [14] , and Sazaki [13] , several results for it of proof-theoretic and of model-theoretic nature are obtained. Earlier, in 1976, using only algebraic means, Epstein and Horn [7] studied the (∧, ∨, , ⊥, ⊃)-fragment of Lewis's systems S4 and S5 and several related systems, where ⊃ is interpreted as strict implication. All can be seen as subintuitionistic logics. But that paper did not consider Kripke semantics. Hacking [8] already studied the mentioned fragments, axiomatizing them using Gentzen systems. A systematic study of several possible subintuitionistic logics is given in Corsi [4] where a logic is defined to be a set of theorems. The logics she deals with are defined by means of the notion of validity in a given class of frames. Moreover, Restall also studies subintuitionistic logics in [10] but now from the perspective of consequence relations defined by means of Kripke frames with a base point related to every point. Given a class of these frames the associated consequence relation is defined by saying that for every model on a frame of the class, if the premises are forced by its base point, then the conclusion is forced too. Several of Restall's logics coincide with several of Corsi's, as far as their theorems are concerned.
In [6] , Došen also studies some subintuitionistic logics treated as sets of theorems, mainly the system K (σ ) whose elements are the formulas valid in every Kripke model. This logic has the same relation to the modal system K as intuitionistic logic has to S4, namely, there is a translation σ of formulas from the intuitionistic language into the modal language such that an intuitionistic formula is a theorem of K (σ ) if and only if its modal translation is a theorem of K. One of Došen's main aims in [6] was to find a logic with this property. If the Hilbert-style calculus introduced by Došen to axiomatize K (σ ) is used to define a consequence relation in the standard way, the consequence relation obtained, which we will also denote by K (σ ), has some shortcomings. Intuitionistic logic has, via Gödel's translation, a stronger relation with S4 than K (σ ) has with K. If τ denotes Gödel's translation, the relation between intuitionistic logic and S4 is as follows. For any set of intuitionistic formulas ∪ {ϕ}, ϕ follows from in intuitionistic logic if and only if τ (ϕ) follows from τ [ ] in the local consequence relation associated with S4 if and only if τ (ϕ) follows from τ [ ] in the global consequence relation associated with S4. The analogous results do not hold for the translation σ considered by Došen and the systems K (σ ) and K.
In the present paper we study systematically several subintuitionistic consequence relations that can be defined considering classes of Kripke models, and some of their extensions. Therefore we depart from the standard perspective of considering a logic just as a set of theorems and also depart from the perspective taken by Restall in that we consider standard Kripke models instead of his models with a base point and his consequence relation. One of the goals of the paper is to introduce two subintuitionistic consequence relations wK σ and s K σ that have the following relations with K via the translation σ considered by Došen: a formula ϕ follows from a set of formulas in wK σ if and only if σ (ϕ) follows from σ [ ] in the local consequence relation associated with K, and ϕ follows from in s K σ if and only if σ (ϕ) follows from σ [ ] in the global consequence relation associated with K. It must be emphasized that for arbitrary and ϕ it does not hold that σ (ϕ) follows from σ [ ] in the local consequence associated with K if and only if σ (ϕ) follows from σ [ ] in the global consequence associated with K. The logic wK σ will be the local consequence relation defined by the class of all Kripke frames and s K σ will be the global consequence relation defined by this class.
Besides these two subintuitionistic logics we will concentrate mainly on the local and the global consequence relations defined by the class of reflexive Kripke models and the class of transitive Kripke models. Moreover, we will consider the Basic Propositional Logic of Visser [17] which following [13] we call Visser's Propositional Logic; it turns out also to be the local consequence relation defined by the class of models with an R-persistent valuation. For all these logics we consider some weaker versions that do not seem to be characterizable by classes of frames.
We will also classify the logics we obtain according to the hierarchy considered in Abstract Algebraic Logic, which is becoming increasingly popular today, namely, as non-protoalgebraic, protoalgebraic, equivalential, and algebraizable. For information on the hierarchy we address the reader to Czelakowski [5] .
Preliminaries
The language of subintuitionistic logics, the si-language for short, is the same language as that of intuitionistic logic. It contains the connectives ∧, ∨, → and the propositional constant ⊥. Moreover, it contains a denumerable set of propositional variables. The formulas are defined as usual, that is, the set of subintuitionistic formulas is the smallest set X that contains ⊥, all the propositional variables, and if ϕ, ψ belong to X then (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ∨ ψ), (ϕ → ψ) ∈ X. We abbreviate the formula ⊥ → ⊥ by . Let us denote the set of all formulas by Fm.
A logic, or deductive system, in the si-language is a pair S = Fm, S where S is a relation, called the entailment relation or the consequence relation of S, between sets of formulas and formulas such that 1. if ϕ ∈ , then S ϕ; 2. if S ϕ and for every ψ ∈ , S ψ, then S ϕ; 3. if S ϕ, then for any substitution e, e[ ] S e(ϕ), where a substitution is a homomorphism from the formula algebra Fm into itself-this property is called substitution invariance.
From (1) and (2) it follows that 4. if S ϕ, then for any formula ψ, ∪ {ψ} S ϕ. Logics can be defined in many ways using either syntactic or semantic means. A logic S is said to be finitary if for every set of formulas ∪ {ϕ}, S ϕ implies that S ϕ for some finite ⊆ . All the logics we deal with in the paper are finitary. We will usually identify a logic with its consequence relation. Given a logic S, an extension of S is a logic S in the same set of formulas such that S ⊆ S .
A Hilbert-style rule will be a pair , ϕ where is a finite set of formulas and ϕ is a formula. Given a Hilbert-style rule , ϕ and a substitution e, we say that the pair e[ ], e(ϕ) is a substitution instance of the rule , ϕ . A Hilbert-style calculus consists of a set of rules closed under substitution instances. The rules of the form ∅, ϕ are called axioms; thus axioms can be identified with formulas. When we say that we add a rule , ϕ to a Hilbert-style calculus we are implicitly saying that we add all its substitution instances, that is, we treat the rules as schemata. A Hilbertstyle calculus H defines in the standard way a logic S H , namely, S H ϕ if and only if there is a proof of ϕ in H using as premises formulas in . A Hilbert-style calculus H is said to be a Hilbert calculus for a logic S if S = S H .
In this paper a sequent is any pair , ϕ where is a (possibly empty) finite set of formulas and ϕ is a formula; we will use the standard notation ϕ for sequents. The Gentzen calculi we will consider are calculi for sequents of that form. When we add a sequent as an axiom to a given Gentzen-style calculus we will also treat it schematically and assume that we add all its substitution instances as well.
When we say that a logic S has , ϕ as a rule, or that , ϕ is a rule of S, we mean that S ϕ. Given a logic S and several (Hilbert) rules R 1 , . . . , R n , the least extension of S that also has R 1 , . . . , R n as rules is denoted by
Given a Hilbert-style calculus H for S the extension S + R 1 + · · · + R n can be axiomatized by the Hilbert calculus whose rules are the rules of H plus the rules R 1 , . . . , R n .
We will now introduce the basic notions considered in Abstract Algebraic Logic for the classification of logics that will be needed in the paper. For each one we take as definition the one that best suits the purposes of the paper but specialized to the silanguage. For an extensive and detailed exposition of the classification, we address the reader to [5] .
A matrix for a logic S is a pair A, F where A is an algebra of the similarity type of the si-language and F is a subset of its universe A. A matrix A, F for S is said to be a model of S, and F is said to be an S-filter of A, if for every set of formulas and every formula ϕ, if S ϕ, then for every valuation v from the set of propositional variables into A such that v[ ] ⊆ F, it holds that v(ϕ) ∈ F; a valuation is simply a homomorphism from the formula algebra into the algebra A.
The Leibniz congruence of a matrix A, F is the greatest congruence of A which is compatible with F, that is, one that does not relate elements of F with elements not in F. As customary we denote the Leibniz congruence of A, F by A (F).
A logic S is protoalgebraic when for every algebra A the operator A is monotonic on the set of all S-filters of A, in the sense that if F and G are S-filters and F ⊆ G then A (F) ⊆ A (G). It can be proved that a logic is protoalgebraic if and only if there is a set of formulas ( p, q) in at most two variables such that 1. for every formula δ( p, q) ∈ , S δ( p, p), 2. p, ( p, q) S q. A logic is equivalential if there is a set of formulas ( p, q) in at most two variables such that 1. for every formula δ( p, q) ∈ , S δ( p, p), 2. for every binary connective ,
3. p, ( p, q) S q. A set with the above properties is called a set of equivalence formulas for S.
A logic is algebraizable if it is equivalential, say with ( p, q) as a set of equivalence formulas, and there is a set of equations in at most one variable E( p) such that for every equation ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ E( p) and every δ( p, q) ∈ , p S δ(ϕ, ψ) and
This set of equations is called a set of defining equations.
Kripke semantics
A Kripke frame is a pair W, R where W is a nonempty set and R is a binary relation on W . A Kripke model is a triple W, R, V where W, R is a Kripke frame and V is a function that assigns to each propositional variable a subset of W . This function can be extended to every formula by means of the following clauses:
Given a frame W, R and x ∈ W , we denote the set {y ∈ W : x Ry} of R-successors of x by R(x). Then condition 4 can be written as follows:
Of a model W, R, V we say that it is a model based on the frame W, R . A formula
The rule associated with a sequent is valid in a model M if every substitution instance of the sequent is valid in M. A formula is valid in a frame if it is valid in every model on the frame; analogously we speak of a sequent being valid in a frame.
To any class F of frames we can associate two consequence relations in the silanguage (and therefore two logics), the local one and the global one. They are defined as follows. Let be a set of formulas and let ϕ be a formula. We say that ϕ is a local consequence from relative to F, in symbols | lF ϕ, if for every model W, R, V based on a frame in F, V ( ) ⊆ V (ϕ). We say that ϕ is a global consequence form relative to F, in symbols | gF ϕ, if every model W, R, V based on a frame in F such that V ( ) = W also verifies that V (ϕ) = W . It is not difficult to show that the relations defined are in fact consequence relations. The most difficult point is to show that they are substitution invariant. This is achived by the following lemma. 
It is not necessary that the consequence relations obtained are finitary; they are if the class of frames is closed under ultraproducts. We will denote by lF and gF the local and the global consequence relations defined by the class of frames F.
We recall the notions of generated subframe and generated submodel. Given a frame W, R , a frame W , R is said to be a generated subframe of the frame W, R if W is an R-closed subset of W (i.e., W ⊆ W and if x ∈ W and x Ry, then y ∈ W ) and R is the restriction of R to W (i.e., R = R ∩ (W × W )). A model W , R , V is said to be a generated submodel of a model W, R, V if W , R is a generated subframe of W, R and the valuation V is such that for every propositional variable p, V ( p) = V ( p) ∩ W . Given a model W, R, V and one of its points x, the submodel generated by x is the model W x , R x , V x where W x is the least subset of W that contains x and is closed under R and W x , R x , V x is the corresponding generated submodel of W, R . We say that W x , R x is the subframe generated by x of W, R . The following lemma is well known.
The relations between the local and the global consequence relations associated with a given class of frames are stated (under certain conditions) in the next proposition. Let us define for every formula ϕ and every natural number n, n → ϕ as follows:
Proposition 2.3
For every class of frames F closed under generated subframes, every set of formulas , and every formula ϕ,
Proof (1) follows immediately from the definitions. To prove (2) , assume that { n → ψ : n ∈ ω, ψ ∈ } | lF ϕ. Let W, R, V be a model based on a frame in F and suppose that V ( ) = W . Then it is easy to see by induction on n that for every formula ψ ∈ and every n, V ( n → ψ) = W . Thus, V (ϕ) = W . This proves the implication from left to right. To prove the other implication assume that | gF ϕ. Let W, R, V be a model based on a frame in F and let x ∈ W be such that for every ψ ∈ and every n, x ∈ V ( n → ψ). It is easy to show by induction on n that for every formula δ,
Let us consider the submodel generated by x, W x , R x , V x , of W, R, V . By assumption its frame belongs to F. Then for all ψ ∈ , V x (ψ) = W x . Thus, by assumption, V x (ϕ) = W x . Therefore x ∈ V (ϕ). Finally, (3) follows immediately from (2).
Given a class of frames F we have its local consequence relation | lF . We can extend it by adding the (Hilbert) rule, 
Proof If { n → ψ : n ∈ ω, ψ ∈ } | lF ϕ, let be a finite subset of and let m be such that { n → ψ : n ≤ m, ψ ∈ } | lF ϕ; they exist because lF is finitary. Then, using the rule (N) and the rule of lF just mentioned, we obtain that sF ϕ and thus the desired result.
To prove the other implication assume that sF ϕ. Since the rule (N) is clearly a rule of | gF , the logic sF is a sublogic of the logic gF. Thus, | gF ϕ. From Proposition 2.3 it follows that { n → ψ : n ∈ ω, ψ ∈ } | lF ϕ.
The next corollary follows immediately from Lemma 2.4 and Proposition 2.3.
Corollary 2.5
For any class of frames F closed under subframes and such that its local consequence relation is finitary, the logic sF is precisely the global consequence relation determined by F.
Došen's Logic
In this section we review the system K (σ ) of [6] and prove that it is algebraizable. It was introduced by Došen to define a logic (as a set of theorems) that has the same relation to the normal modal logic K as intuitionistic logic has to S4, that is, there is a translation of the formulas of the intuitionistic language into formulas of the modal language such that a formula is a theorem K (σ ) if and only if its translation is a theorem of K. The translation σ considered by Došen is defined by
is defined as the set of formulas ϕ such that σ (ϕ) is a theorem of K. An axiomatization is given by the Hilbert-style calculus K σ which we display below. A similar axiomatization is given in [4] . As usual we can associate a consequence relation with this calculus using the notion of proof with premises, that is, by declaring that a formula ϕ follows from a set of formulas , in symbols K σ ϕ, if there is a proof of ϕ in the given calculus K σ that uses premises in . This logic can be called Došen's logic and we will also denote it by K σ . Its consequence relation will be denoted by K σ .
Hilbert-style calculus

Axioms
An alternative set of rules consists of (MP) and the rule
The following rules are derived rules:
Using the rules (Pr) and (Sf) it is easy to see that Došen's logic is an implicative logic of Rasiowa [9] and is therefore algebraizable (see Blok and Pigozzi [3] ). We highlight this fact.
Theorem 3.1 Došen's logic is algebraizable.
We have the following completeness theorem for Došen's logic, proved in [6] .
Theorem 3.2 (Došen)
K σ ϕ if and only if ϕ holds in every Kripke model. The relation between Intuitionistic logic (Int) and the modal logic S4 given by Gödel's translation τ is such that for every set of intuitionistic formulas and every intuitionistic formula ϕ,
where S4 is the local consequence of S4; it can be defined syntactically by S4 ϕ if and only if ϕ is a theorem of S4, or there are ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ such that ϕ 0 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n → ϕ is a theorem of S4. Došen's logic and the translation σ do not have this property with respect to the logic
Here K refers to the local consequence of K, which can be defined syntactically as we did for the S4 case.
In the next section we define a logic wK σ with the property that
, and thus with the same set of theorems as K σ .
Weak Došen's Logic
Although Došen's logic has as its set of theorems the formulas valid in every Kripke frame, its entailment relation does not coincide with the local consequence relation defined by the class of all Kripke frames which we simply denote by | l . For example, modus ponens is not valid for this consequence relation. The model {a}, ∅, V , where V ( p) = {a} and V (q) = ∅, witnesses this fact. For instance,
Moreover, Došen's logic does not coincide with the global consequence relation defined by the class of all Kripke frames as we will show later.
Local consequence
The local consequence relation of all Kripke models can be axiomatized by the following Gentzen-style calculus; this is the content of the soundness and completeness theorem we will prove below. The calculus operates on sequents of the form ϕ where is a (possibly empty) finite set of formulas and ϕ is a formula.
Gentzen rules
ϕ , ψ ϕ ϕ , ϕ ψ ψ ⊥ ϕ , ϕ, ψ α , ϕ ∧ ψ α ϕ ψ ϕ ∧ ψ , ϕ α , ψ α , ϕ ∨ ψ α ϕ ϕ ∨ ψ ψ ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ ψ ∅ ϕ → ψ (DT 0 )
Gentzen Axioms
The following rules are derivable.
We can replace (DT 0 ) with (Pre) to obtain an equivalent calculus.
The above calculus defines a logic, which we denote by wK σ , in the standard way, namely, wK σ ϕ if and only if there is a finite ⊆ such that the sequent ϕ is derivable. Now we prove the completeness theorem for wK σ mentioned above. The ideas of the proof are the ideas used by Dosěn to prove the completeness theorem for the system K σ .
A set of formulas is a theory of wK σ if it is closed under the relation wK σ . A theory is consistent if there is some formula ϕ ∈ , and it is prime if it is consistent and for all formulas ϕ, ψ such that ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ , ϕ ∈ or ψ ∈ .
Let W c = { : is a prime theory of wK σ } and define the binary relation R c in W c as follows: 
Lemma 4.1 For every prime theory and any formula ϕ,
∈ V c (ϕ) iff ϕ in .
Proof
The proof is by induction. We only deal with the implication case. If ϕ → ψ ∈ , it is clear that if R c and ϕ ∈ then ψ ∈ . Therefore, ∈ V c (ϕ → ψ). On the other hand, if ϕ → ψ ∈ , we see that there is ∈ W c such that R c , ϕ ∈ and ψ ∈ . Let us consider the set F = { : is a theory, ϕ ∈ , ψ ∈ and ∀δ, ε(δ → ε ∈ & δ ∈ ⇒ ε ∈ )}. This set is nonempty as 0 = {δ : ϕ → δ ∈ } is a theory that verifies the conditions for being an element of F . To see this one has to use the prefixing rules. Using Zorn's lemma we obtain a maximal element in F . Let us see that is prime. Assume that δ ∨ ε ∈ , that δ ∈ , and that ε ∈ . Let F( , δ) = {ε : ∃γ ∈ (γ ∧ δ) → ε ∈ }. This set is a theory that includes ∪ {ϕ, δ} and verifies the condition
This can be seen using the prefixing rules. Therefore, as is properly included in F( , δ), ψ ∈ F( , δ). Analogously, the set
is a theory that includes ∪ {ϕ, ε} and verifies the condition
Therefore, as is properly included in F( , ε), ψ ∈ F( , ε). Let us now consider δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ such that
, we obtain that ψ ∈ , which is absurd. Proof If wK σ ϕ, then ϕ does not belong to the theory generated by . Let us consider the set F = { : is a theory such that ⊆ and ϕ ∈ }. By Zorn's lemma there is a maximal set in F in the inclusion order. Let us see that it is a prime theory. Assume that ψ ∨ δ ∈ and ψ, δ ∈ . Let 1 be the theory generated by ∪ {ψ} and 2 the theory generated by ∪ {δ}. If 1 is inconsistent, ∪ {ψ} wK σ δ. Therefore ∪ {ψ ∨ δ} wK σ δ, that is, wK σ δ, which is not the case. Hence, 1 is consistent. Analogously it can be seen that 2 is consistent. By maximality of , ϕ ∈ 1 and ϕ ∈ 2 . So, ∪ {ψ} wK σ ϕ and ∪ {δ} wK σ ϕ. Therefore, ∪ {ψ ∨ δ} wK σ ϕ, that is, wK σ ϕ, which is absurd.
Theorem 4.3 (Soundness and Completeness)
For every set of formulas and every formula ϕ,
Proof The soundness part is routine. The completeness part follows from Lemma 4.2.
Corollary 4.4 The local consequence of the class of all frames is finitary.
Proof It follows from the soundness and completeness theorem because the logic wK σ is finitary by definition. It also follows from the fact that the class of all frames is closed under ultraproducts.
Theorems 3.2 and 4.3 imply that the theorems of the logic wK σ are exactly the theorems of the logic K σ . What is the exact relation between wK σ and K σ ? To answer this question, let us show that a restricted version of modus ponens holds in wK σ .
Proposition 4.5 If wK
Proof Assume wK σ ϕ → ψ. We use completeness. Assume that W, R, V is a Kripke model and that
Then it is easy to show by induction that for any formula ϕ,
The proposition implies that K σ is a proper extension of wK σ .
Proposition 4.6 K σ is a proper extension of wK σ .
Proof First we observe that
This holds because ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n wK σ ψ if and only if ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n wK σ ψ if and only if wK σ (ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n ) → ψ (by (DT 0 ) and the previous proposition) if and
since by the completeness theorem K σ and wK σ have the same theorems). Therefore, if wK σ ϕ, then there is a finite ⊆ ϕ such that wK σ ϕ. By (1) and the fact that (MP) and (Ad) are rules of K σ , we obtain that K σ ϕ. Therefore K σ ϕ. Thus K σ is an extension of wK σ . That it is proper follows from the fact that (MP) is not a rule of wK σ as is implied by the comment at the beginning of the section and the soundness part of Theorem 4.3.
The relation between K σ and wK σ established in (1) of the preceding proof allows us to establish the relation, given by the translation σ considered by Došen, between wK σ and the local consequence relation associated with the modal logic K that we denote by l K .
Theorem 4.7 For every set of subintuitionistic formulas and every subintuitionistic formula ψ,
where σ is the translation of the subintuitionistic language into the modal language considered by Došen. So,
. Since δ/δ is an admissible rule of l K (i.e., if δ is a theorem of l K then δ is a theorem of l K ) we obtain that
. From this the desired result easily follows.
The content of Theorem 4.7 can be described in the following way: wK σ is the strict implication fragment (with ∧, ∨, and ⊥) of the local consequence associated with the normal modal logic K. A semantic proof can be given by showing that for every Kripke model W, R, V and every formula ϕ, if we denote by V * the extension of V to the modal language, V (ϕ) = V * (σ (ϕ)).
We know that the logic wK σ does not satisfy modus ponens. In fact, as we will see, there is no formula δ( p, q) such that p, δ( p, q) wK σ q and wK σ δ( p, p) and indeed no set ( p, q) of formulas with these properties. This means that the logic wK σ is not protoalgebraic (cf. [5] ). The proof of the following theorem uses the algebra that Suzuki, Wolter, and Zacharyaschev use in [15] to prove the analogous result for the logic BPL, which is an extension of wK σ .
Theorem 4.8 The logic wK σ is not protoalgebraic.
Proof Let us consider the algebra A whose universe A is {1, a, 0}, the infimum and supremum are defined according to the linear order 0 < a < 1, and the operation → A is the constant function 1. It is easy to check that the matrices A, {1} and A, {1, a} are models of wK σ . Now, A ({1}) is the congruence that only identifies a and 0 and A ({1, a}) is the congruence that only identifies a and 1. Therefore, A ({1}) ⊆ A ({1, a}). Since {1} ⊆ {1, a} we conclude that wK σ is not protoalgebraic.
Global consequence
The global consequence relation defined by the class of all Kripke frames will be denoted simply by | g . From Proposition 2.3 we obtain the following.
Proposition 4.9
The proposition implies that the global consequence defined by the class of all Kripke frames is a finitary consequence relation. Let us denote by s K σ the logic axiomatized by all the Hilbert rules of wK σ plus the rule (N). Recall that this rule is ϕ → ϕ. Another axiomatization of s K σ can be given by adding the rule (W) to wK σ . In fact, modulo wK σ , the rule (W) and the rule (N) are equivalent.
Proposition 4.11 s K
Proof It is clear that rule (N) follows from (W). On the other hand, by completeness of wK σ one obtains that → ϕ wK σ ψ → ϕ (this can also be deduced using (Suf)). Hence, by the rule (N) we obtain (W).
At this point a warning is in order. Adding the rule (W) to wK σ spoils the closure of the logic so obtained under (some of) the Gentzen rules of the calculus used to define wK σ . For instance, the rule of introduction of the disjunction on the left does not hold. For example,
Thus s K σ does not have what in some contexts is called the property of disjunction. In addition, the rule (DT 0 ) does not hold. We
Since the new rule (N) of s K σ is an instance of the rule (W) of K σ we obtain that K σ is an extension of s K σ too. In fact, it is a proper extension since, as we will see in the next proof, modus ponens is not a rule of s K σ . The exact extension relation between the three logics considered thus far is the following.
Theorem 4.12 wK
Proof It is clear that (N) is not a rule of wK σ because, for example, the model
where V ( p) = {a} is such that a ∈ V ( p) but a ∈ V ( → p). Moreover, modus ponens is not a sound rule of s K σ because the model {a}, ∅, V where V ( p) = {a} and
But not only is modus ponens not a sound rule of s K σ , s K σ is not protoalgebraic.
Theorem 4.13 The logic s K σ is not protoalgebraic.
Proof The matrices used in the proof of Theorem 4.8 are clearly models of s K σ since the rule (N) is sound for them.
To conclude the section let us see how s K σ is related to the normal modal logic K via the translation σ . Let us denote by g K the global consequence relation associated with K. Theorem 4.14 For every set of subintuitionistic formulas and every subintuitionistic formula ϕ,
Proof The following equivalences show it:
The third equivalence holds because σ ( → ψ) is equivalent to σ (ψ), and the fourth because the relation between gK and l K is, as is well known, the following:
where ∪ {ϕ} is now a set of formulas in the modal language.
Theorem 4.14 shows that s K σ is the strict implication fragment (with ∧, ∨, and ⊥) of the global consequence associated with the normal modal logic K. The global and local consequence relations for the class of models with a reflexive and transitive relation and a R-persistent valuation coincide, and both are the intuitionistic consequence. With respect to the global consequence relation gS4 associated with S4 and Intuitionistic consequence, Gödel's translation τ has the same property as σ with respect to the global consequence associated with K and the logic s K σ because
The reason why the last equivalence holds is because of the deduction theorem for gS4, and the reason why the penultimate equivalence holds is that the set of values of the translation of an intuitionistic formula is always R-persistent, and we are in S4. Therefore, the local and the global consequence relations associated with S4 are the same when restricted to the Gödel translations of intuitionistic formulas. The analogous situation does not hold for K and σ . Thus, to obtain real analogs of the intuitionistic situation for the translation σ and the system K we have to consider two logics instead of one, wK σ and s K σ ; neither of them is the logic we called Došen's logic.
Modus Ponens and Reflexivity
In this section we will study the logics obtained when one adds the rule of modus ponens to the logics of the previous section, and the connections between modus ponens and reflexive frames.
Given the logic wK σ and several (Hilbert) rules R 1 , . . . , R n , we denote by
the logic defined by the Gentzen calculus obtained by adding as axioms the rules R 1 , . . . , R n to the Gentzen calculus G used to define wK σ . The first observation concerning modus ponens and reflexivity is the following.
Proposition 5.1 Let W, R be a Kripke frame. Then R is reflexive if and only if modus ponens holds in W, R .
Proof If R is reflexive and V is a valuation on W, R such that
On the other hand, if modus ponens holds in W, R , let x ∈ W and consider a valuation V such that
In [4] , Corsi considers the set of theorems of the logic obtained by adding to K σ the axiom
and shows that a formula is a theorem of the logic so obtained if and only if it is valid in every reflexive Kripke frame. But the formula p ∧ ( p → q) → q does not correspond to reflexivity on Kripke frames. Indeed, it is valid in every reflexive Kripke frame but is also valid in some nonreflexive Kripke frames.
Proposition 5.2 Although p ∧ ( p → q) → q is valid in every reflexive Kripke frame, there are nonreflexive Kripke frames where it is valid.
Proof Consider the frame {a}, ∅ . Then, since R(a) = ∅, for every valuation V , every conditional formula is valid; hence our formula is valid.
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 show that from the point of view of the correspondence of properties of Kripke frames with the validity on them of formulas/sequents in the subintuitionistic language, the sequents are much more well behaved. This phenomena will appear again when we consider transitivity.
We turn now to the consideration of extensions of the logic wK σ with modus ponens. At least two natural extensions come to mind. One is the logic wK σ +(MP); the other is the logic wK σ (MP). The first of the following results show that these two logics are not the same; in fact, the second is a proper extension of the first one. Proof (1) The set of theorems of wK σ and of K σ are the same but this set is closed under modus ponens; this implies that wK σ + (MP) and K σ have the same theorems.
(2) The formula p ∧ ( p → q) → q is a theorem of wK σ (MP) since by (MP), the rules for conjunction and Cut, p ∧ ( p → q) q is derivable, which by (DT 0 ) implies that ∅ p ∧ ( p → q) → q is derivable too. Now it is easy to construct a Kripke model where p ∧ ( p → q) → q is not valid, thus showing that the formula is not a theorem of K σ . Consider just two different points a and b, with a related to b, and a valuation where p is true only at b and q is false everywhere. In this model the formula under consideration is not true at a. (2), wK σ + (MP) and wK σ (MP) cannot be equal. Moreover, it is clear that every rule of any axiomatization of wK σ + (MP) is a rule of the logic wK σ (MP) so this last logic is a proper extension of the other one.
(4) It follows from the fact that all the rules of wK σ + (MP) are valid in any reflexive Kripke model but there are reflexive Kripke models where the rule (W), which is a rule of K σ , is not valid. We leave it to the reader to find one.
A consequence of the proposition is the frame incompleteness result below. We say that a logic is frame complete if every rule and every formula valid in all the frames where the rules of the logic are valid is a rule of the logic or a theorem of the logic.
Theorem 5.4 The logic wK σ + (MP) is frame incomplete.
Proof It follows from Proposition 5.1 that the frames where all the rules of wK σ + (MP) are valid are the reflexive frames. The formula p ∧ ( p → q) → q is valid in all reflexive frames, but, by (2) and (4) of Proposition 5.3, it is not a theorem of wK σ + (MP).
The frame completion of wK σ + (MP), namely, the logic of the class of frames where the sequents of the logic wK σ + (MP) are valid, is wK σ (MP), as follows from the next theorem. We want to prove that the logic wK σ (MP) is precisely the local consequence defined by the class of all reflexive frames. To do so we can perform a completeness proof analogous to that of Theorem 4.3 for wK σ and show that the relation of the canonical model is reflexive.
Theorem 5.5 wK σ (MP) is the local consequence defined by the class of all reflexive Kripke frames.
Proof The canonical Kripke frame for wK σ (MP) is reflexive: if ϕ → ψ, ϕ ∈ , by (MP), ψ ∈ . Therefore R c . Now we turn to s K σ and the global consequence defined by the class of all reflexive Kripke frames.
Theorem 5.6 s K
On the other hand, every axiom of the axiomatization of K σ is a theorem of s K σ . Clearly (Ad) is a rule of s K σ . Moreover, since s K σ is the global consequence defined by the class of all Kripke frames, it is clear that the rule (W) is a rule of s K σ . Hence all the rules of the given axiomatization of K σ are rules of s K σ + (MP). We conclude that
By Corollary 2.5 the logic obtained by adding the rule (N) to wK σ (MP), or alternatively (W) (we can reason as in Proposition 4.11 to show this), is the global consequence relation defined by the class of all reflexive Kripke frames.
Theorem 5.7 The logic wK σ (MP) + (W) is the global consequence defined by the class of all reflexive Kripke frames.
This last logic has the same theorems as wK σ (MP); therefore it is not equal to K σ but is one of its extensions. The reason is that every axiom of K σ is a theorem of wK σ (MP) and also every rule of K σ is one of its rules.
Proposition 5.8 K σ < wK σ (MP) + (W).
Summarizing we have wK σ < wK σ + (MP) < wK σ (MP) < wK σ (MP) + (W), and
. We now move to the consideration of the logics obtained by adding (R) as an axiom to the logics already considered.
Proposition 5.9
1. The logics wK σ (MP), wK σ (MP) + (W), and wK σ + (W) + (MP) + (R), which is K σ + (R), have the same theorems.
Proof (1) By Corsi's results in [4] the theorems of K σ +(R) are the formulas valid in every reflexive Kripke frame and these are precisely the theorems of wK σ (MP) and wK σ (MP) + (W).
(2) It holds because (R) is valid in every reflexive Kripke frame and therefore is a theorem of wK σ (MP).
(3) The first equality holds because (R) is a theorem of wK σ (MP). We prove now that
holds by the same reason. To prove that K σ + (R) extends wK σ (MP) + (W), it suffices to show that if ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n−1 wK σ (MP) ϕ, then ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n−1 K σ +(R) ϕ. Assume that ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n−1 wK σ (MP) ϕ. Using the rules for ∧ and (DT 0 ) of the Gentzen calculus we obtain that
Using the inference rules of the axiomatization of K σ it follows that ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n−1 K σ +(R) ϕ.
Theorem 5.10
The logics wK σ + (R) and s K σ + (R) are non-protoalgebraic. Moreover, all the logics with (MP) are protoalgebraic.
Proof The matrices used in the proof of Theorem 4.8 show that wK σ + (R) and s K σ + (R) are non-protoalgebraic. For the logics with (MP), in each one holds that p → p is a theorem and that modus ponens is a rule, this is known to imply protoalgebraicity.
Theorem 5.11
The logics K σ + (R) and wK σ (MP) + (W) are algebraizable.
Proof They are extensions of the algebraizable logic K σ .
Proposition 5.12
The axiomatic extensions by (R) of the logics wK σ , s K σ , wK σ + (MP), and s K σ + (MP) are proper extensions.
Proof The four logics wK σ , s K σ , wK σ + (MP), and s K σ + (MP) have the same theorems, namely, the formulas valid in all Kripke frames, and we know that (R) is not a theorem of s K σ + (MP). Proposition 5.13
To prove the proposition it is convenient to present first an auxiliary lemma. To state it we introduce the next definition.
Definition 5.14
Let W, R, V be a model, F ⊆ {V (ϕ) : ϕ ∈ Fm} and , ϕ be a Hilbert-style rule. We will say that , ϕ is F-valid in W, R, V if for every substitution instance e[ ], e(ϕ) of , ϕ such that {V (e(ψ)) : ψ ∈ } ⊆ F it holds that V (e(ϕ)) ∈ F. 
To prove the other inequality it is clear that wK σ + (W) + (MP) + (R), which is K σ + (R), is an extension of wK σ + (W) + (R) and that they are different follows from the fact that the first one is non-protoalgebraic and the second one is algebraizable.
(2) There are Kripke frames where (MP) is not valid but (R) is; for instance, the frame considered in the proof of Proposition 5.2. This proves the first inequality. That wK σ + (MP) + (R) ≤ wK σ (MP) is obvious since (R) is a theorem of wK σ (MP). To prove that these two logics are different we will see that the for-
, which is clearly a theorem of wK σ (R) and therefore of wK σ (MP), is not a theorem of wK σ + (MP) + (R). To this end we will use Lemma 5.15. We consider the Kripke frame F = W, R where W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 } and R = { w 1 , w 1 , w 1 , w 2 , w 1 , w 3 , w 2 , w 2 , w 2 , w 1 }. Let A be the set whose elements are 0 := ∅, 1 := W , a := {w 3 }, and b := {w 2 , w 3 }. This set is closed under intersections, unions, and the operation that serves to interpret →, namely, the operation ⇒ R on the powerset of W defined by X ⇒ R Y = {x ∈ W : R(x) ∩ X ⊆ Y }, for every X, Y ∈ P (W ) which, restricted to A, is displayed in the following table.
⇒ 0 a b 1  0 1 1 1 1  a  b 1 1 1  b a a 1 1  1 a a a 1 Consider the set F = {{w 2 , w 3 }, W }. It is easy to check that for any X, Y ∈ A,
is not a theorem of wK σ +(MP)+(R). 1 Finally, let us see which logics are obtained when (R) is added as an axiom to the Gentzen calculus used to define wK σ . We will consider the logics wK σ (R), wK σ (R) + (MP), wK σ (R) + (W), and wK σ (R) + (W) + (MP); wK σ (MP, R) has already been considered. We have the situation displayed in the next proposition. To prove it we will use the following fact, proved by Bou.
Fact 5.16 (Bou)
wK σ (R) can be axiomatized by adding to the logic wK σ the axioms of the form n → ϕ where ϕ is a formula of the form
This fact can be proved by syntactic means and its proof is beyond the scope of this paper.
Proposition 5.17
Proof (1) The first inequality follows from (2). The second inequality follows because there are models of (R) where (MP) does not hold. For instance, the model used in the proof of Proposition 5.2. To prove the third inequality, since (R) is a theorem of wK σ (MP), it is enough to show that wK σ (R) + (MP) and wK σ (MP) are different. We will use Lemma 5.15. Let us consider the frame F = W, R where W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 } and R = { w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 3 }. Consider the set A whose elements are 0 = ∅, a = {w 1 }, b = {w 2 }, c = {w 1 , w 2 }, and 1 = W . This set is closed under unions, intersections, and the operation ⇒ R that interprets →, displayed in the following table. 
Hence, by Lemma 5.15 and Fact 5.16, we obtain that
(2) In the proof of (2) of Proposition 5.13 we have shown that
is not a theorem of wK σ + (R) + (MP). But this formula is easily seen to be a theorem of wK σ (R), thus of wK σ (R) + (MP).
, is an extension of wK σ + (W) + (R). That they are different follows from the fact that the second logic is non-protoalgebraic and the first one is algebraizable.
This last logic is wK σ (MP) + (W). We know from (1) that wK σ (R) + (MP) < wK σ (MP) and we also know that wK σ (MP) < wK σ (MP) + (W). Thus we have (4).
Proposition 5.18
The logics wK σ (R) and wK σ (R) + (W) are non-protoalgebraic. The logics with (MP) are protoalgebraic and the logic wK σ (R) + (W) + (MP) is algebraizable.
Proof The matrices in the proof of Proposition 4.8 can also be used in this case to show that wK σ (R) and wK σ (R) + (W) are non-protoalgebraic. The reason why the logics with (MP) are protoalgebraic is the same as the one given in Proposition 5.10. Finally, wK σ (R) + (W) + (MP) is algebraizable because it is an extension of the algebraizable logic K σ .
To conclude this section let us state the relation that the logics wK σ (MP) and wK σ (MP) + (W) have to the normal modal logic KT. Let us denote by lKT the local consequence in the modal language associated with KT and by gKT the global consequence; they are, respectively, the local and global consequence relations determined by the class of all reflexive frames in the language of modal logic.
Theorem 5.19
For every set of subintuitionistic formulas and every subintuitionistic formula ϕ,
Proof The proof of the first equivalence is analogous to the semantic proof of Theorem 4.7 and the proof of the second one to the proof of Theorem 4.14.
Transitivity
In this section we turn to the study of the logics determined by the class of transitive frames. We consider the rule
Notice that the rule (RT) is a particular case of the rule (W) so the logics wK σ + (W) and wK σ (W) have this rule. Moreover, by (DT 0 ), the formulas of the form (T) are theorems of wK σ (W).
First we set up the relation between transitivity, (RT) and (T).
Proposition 6.1 Let F = W, R be a Kripke frame. Then R is transitive if and only if the rule (RT) holds in F .
Proof It is very easy to check that if R is transitive (RT) holds in the frame. To prove the converse, assume that (RT) holds in W, R . If x Ry and y Rz, to see that x Rz let us consider any valuation V such that
. Thus, since y Rz, x Rz.
Proposition 6.2 (T) is valid in all transitive Kripke frames but it is also valid in some nontransitive Kripke frame.
Proof The first part is easily proved. To prove the second part consider the frame {a, b, c}, { a, b , b, c } , which is nontransitive. Tedious checking shows that (T) is valid in that frame. Now we can proceed to consider the different logics we obtain by adding (RT) to the logics of the above sections. As in the case of reflexivity we find an incompleteness phenomena.
Lemma 6.3 The set of theorems of the logic wK σ is closed under the rule (RT).
Therefore wK σ + (RT) has the same theorems as wK σ .
This proves the first part of the lemma. To prove the second part recall that wK σ + (RT) is defined as the logic obtained by the Hilbert calculus whose rules are all the rules of wK σ plus the rule (RT). It is enough to see that any proof of a theorem of wK σ + (RT) produces a theorem of wK σ because the set of theorems of wK σ is closed under (RT).
Theorem 6.4 The logic wK σ + (RT) is frame incomplete.
Proof The frames in which all the rules of the logic are valid are the transitive frames. The formula ( p → q) → (r → ( p → q)) is valid in every transitive frame but is not a theorem of wK σ + (RT) since it is not a theorem of wK σ : there are nontransitive models where it is not valid.
In the sequel we deal first of all with wK σ (RT), which is the local consequence relation of all the transitive frames. The proof of this fact is analogous to the completeness proof for wK σ . The only adjustment needed is to check that the canonical model is transitive.
Theorem 6.5 wK σ (RT) is the local consequence defined by the class of all transitive frames.
Proof The canonical Kripke frame for wK σ (RT) is transitive. Assume that 1 R c 2 and 2 R c 3 . To show that 1 R c 3 , assume that ϕ → ψ ∈ 1 and ϕ ∈ 3 . Then by (RT), → (ϕ → ψ) ∈ 1 . Since ∈ 2 , ϕ → ψ ∈ 2 . Since 2 R c 3 we conclude that ψ ∈ 3 .
Notice that although (RT) is a rule of wK σ + (W), the logic wK σ (RT) + (W) is not equal to wK σ + (W). The point is that (T) is a theorem of wK σ (RT) + (W), but is not a theorem of wK σ +(W). As in the case of wK σ and wK σ (MP) we can consider the logic wK σ (RT) + (W) (alternatively wK σ (RT) + (N)). By Corollary 2.5 it is the global consequence defined by the class of all transitive Kripke frames.
Theorem 6.6 The logic wK σ (RT) + (W) is the global consequence defined by the class of all transitive Kripke frames.
Summarizing the relations between the logics treated up to now in this section we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6.7
1. wK σ + (RT) < wK σ (RT) < wK σ (RT) + (W). 2. wK σ + (RT) < wK σ + (RT) + (W) = wK σ + (W) < wK σ (RT) + (W).
Proof (1) As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 6.4, the formula ( p → q) → (r → ( p → q)) is not a theorem of wK σ + (RT), but using (DT 0 ) it is clear that it is a theorem of wK σ (RT). Moreover since (W) is not valid in the class of all transitive frames the other inequality follows.
(2) The first inequality holds because there are transitive models where (W) is not valid, and all the rules of wK σ + (RT) are valid in transitive models. The equality is clear since (RT) is a special case of (W). The last inequality follows because the theorems of wK σ + (W) are the theorems of wK σ and the formulas of the form (T) are theorems of wK σ (RT) + (W).
It is clear that the formulas of the form (T) are theorems of the logics wK σ (RT) and wK σ (RT) + (W) since they are valid in all transitive Kripke frames. It makes sense to consider also the logics wK σ + (T), wK σ + (RT) + (T), and wK σ + (W) + (T). For these logics the known situation is the following. 
Thus for any valuation V taking values in A, the rules (RT) and (T) are {1}-valid.
Consider any valuation taking values in
Another logic worth considering is the logic K σ + (T), that is, wK σ + (MP) + (W) + (T). The set of its theorems has been studied in [4] where it is proved that it is the set of formulas valid in every transitive frame. Thus this logic has the same theorems as wK σ (RT). In this paper we will not explore other combinations of the rules (MP) and (RT) and the axioms (R) and (T).
Concerning the classification of the logics considered in this section let us state that none of them except K σ + (T), which is algebraizable, is protoalgebraic. K σ + (T) is algebraizable because it is an extension of the algebraizable logic K σ .
Proposition 6.9 None of the logics considered with the rule (RT) or the axiom (T), besides K σ + (T), which is algebraizable, is protoalgebraic.
Proof Using the matrices in the proof of Theorem 4.8 it can be shown that none of the logics wK σ +(W)+(T), wK σ (RT)+(W), and wK σ +(W)+(T) is protoalgebraic. Each of the other logics has wK σ (RT) + (W) or wK σ + (W) + (T) as an extension. So they cannot be protoalgebraic either because any extension of a protoalgebraic logic is protoalgebraic.
To conclude this section, we state in the next theorem the relation between the modal logic K4 and the logics wK σ (RT) and wK σ (RT)+(W) established by the translation σ . Let us denote by lK4 the local consequence relation associated with K4 and by gK4 the corresponding global consequence relation; they are, respectively, the local and global consequence relations determined by the class of all transitive frames in the modal language. Theorem 6.10 For every set of subintuitionistic formulas and every subintuitionistic formula ϕ,
Reflexivity plus Transitivity
We can go on with different combinations of the rules (RT), (MP), and the axioms (T) and (R), adding them to wK σ and s K σ to obtain new logics or adding them to the Gentzen calculus for wK σ with the same purpose. In this section we will concentrate mainly on two of them, the logics that correspond to the local and to the global consequence relations of the class of all reflexive and transitive frames. From Propositions 5.1 and 6.1 and the proofs of Theorems 5.5 and 6.5 the next theorem easily follows.
Theorem 7.1 The logic wK σ (MP, RT) is the local consequence of the class of all reflexive and transitive frames.
In the same way as we did for the logics wK σ , wK σ (MP), and wK σ (RT) we can prove that adding (W) to wK σ (MP, RT) we obtain the global consequence of the class of all reflexive and transitive frames.
Theorem 7.2
The logic wK σ (MP, RT) + (W) is the global consequence of the class of all reflexive and transitive frames.
We consider in addition the logic wK σ + (MP) + (RT). It has the same theorems as wK σ because the set of theorems of this logic is closed, as we already know, under (MP) and (RT). So here we also have an incompleteness phenomena: The logic wK σ + (MP) + (RT) is not frame complete. Its class of frames is the class of all reflexive and transitive frames, and neither p → q) ) belong to the set of its theorems. Proof The set of formulas { p → q, q → p}, which we abbreviate by p ↔ q, is a set of equivalence formulas for wK σ (MP, RT). We prove it by showing that it has the required syntactical properties. We have (MP), therefore, p, p ↔ q wK σ (MP,RT) q. p → p is a theorem, thus
Finally it is easy to check that
holds. To prove it semantically one has to make an essential use of transitivity. Moreover, it is clear that
Theorem 7.5
The logic wK σ (MP, RT)+(W) is algebraizable with the set of equivalence formulas { p → q, q → p} and the set of defining equations { p ≈ }.
Proof By the above theorem, the logic wK σ (MP, RT) is equivalential with the set of equivalence formulas { p → q, q → p}. Thus, since wK σ (MP, RT) + (W) is an extension of wK σ (MP, RT), it is equivalential with the same set of equivalence formulas. To prove that it is algebraizable we can show that it has the syntactical properties required in the definition we gave in Section 2. Since it is equivalential with { p → q, q → p} we need only to prove that As in the above sections we can state the relationship given by the translation σ between the logics wK σ (MP, RT) and wK σ (MP, RT) + (W) and a modal logic. Let us denote by lS4 the local consequence relation between modal formulas associated with S4, and by gS4 the corresponding global consequence relation.
Theorem 7.6
is not one of its theorems since there are reflexive and transitive models in which it is not valid.
Visser's Propositional Logic
In [17] , by means of a natural deduction calculus, Visser defined a logic he called Basic Propositional Logic and which we will call, following [13] , Visser's Propositional Logic, VPL for short. He proved that it is the local consequence relation defined by the class of all transitive models with a valuation V with the property that for every propositional variable p, if x ∈ V ( p) and y is accessible from x then y ∈ V ( p). VPL turns out to be the logic defined by the Gentzen calculus for wK σ plus the following rule
Let us call the logic defined by this Gentzen calculus wK σ (DT 1 ). We will prove that it is VPL and will study some of its properties. wK σ (DT 1 ) does not have (MP) as a derivable rule nor (R) as a theorem. Notice that if we add (DT 1 ) to the Gentzen calculus G then the rule (W) is derivable: the sequent ϕ, δ ϕ is derivable, so by (DT 1 ) we obtain the sequent ϕ δ → ϕ.
We say that a Kripke model W, R, V is a model of a Gentzen-style rule
, and we say that the rule is valid in a frame if every model in the frame is a model of the rule.
A valuation V on a frame W, R is said to be R-persistent (or R-increasing, or R-upclosed) if for every formula ϕ, V (ϕ) is an R-persistent set, that is, if x ∈ V (ϕ) and x Ry, then y ∈ V (ϕ). It is a well-known fact that if a frame is transitive and V is a valuation such that for every propositional variable p, V ( p) is R-persistent, then V is R-persistent. However, there are R-persistent valuations in nontransitive frames. We will see that if W, R, V is a Kripke model of the rule (DT 1 ) then V is R-persistent. Moreover, any Kripke model satisfying this condition is a Kripke model of the rule. The same situation holds for the rule (W).
Proposition 8.1
The following conditions are equivalent for any Kripke model M = W, R, V :
1. M is a model of (DT 1 ); 2. M is a model of (W); 3. for every formula ϕ, V (ϕ) is R-persistent.
Proof (1) ⇒ (2) Because (W) follows from (DT 1 ).
(2) ⇒ (3) Assume that M is a model of (W). Then V (ϕ) ⊆ V ( → ϕ). In order to see that V (ϕ) is R-persistent let x ∈ V (ϕ) and let x Ry. Then, as x ∈ V ( → ϕ) and y ∈ V ( ), y ∈ V (ϕ).
. So we can conclude that (DT 1 ) holds.
Proposition 8.2
The following conditions are equivalent for any Kripke frame W, R : This corollary shows that when we are interested in the condition 'the valuation is R-persistent', the frame perspective is not the right one. It is sensible to restrict the valuations on frames to the R-persistent ones. Then we have the following completeness result. Proof The implication from left to right follows from Proposition 8.2. To prove the other implication it is enough to argue as in the proof of the completeness theorem for the logic wK σ , proving that the canonical model obtained is such that V c is R cpersistent. This follows from the fact that for every formula ϕ, ϕ wK σ (DT 1 ) → ϕ. Assume that ∈ V c (ϕ) and R c . Then ϕ ∈ . Therefore, → ϕ ∈ . As ∈ , ϕ ∈ . Hence, ∈ V c (ϕ).
The same proof works for the logic wK σ (W). Proof First we show that R c is transitive. Assume 1 R c 2 and 2 R c 3 . Then assume that ϕ → ψ ∈ 1 and ϕ ∈ 3 . Now, ϕ → ψ wK σ (DT 1 ) → (ϕ → ψ); therefore → (ϕ → ψ) ∈ 1 . Moreover, ∈ 2 . Hence we have ϕ → ψ ∈ 2 . Therefore, ψ ∈ 3 . We conclude that 1 R c 3 .
To see that R c is included in the subset relation, assume that R c and ϕ ∈ , then since ϕ wK σ (DT 1 ) → ϕ, → ϕ ∈ . As ∈ , ϕ ∈ .
The fact that the relation of the canonical model of wK σ (DT 1 ) is transitive shows that wK σ (DT 1 ) is complete relative to the class of models W, R, V where R is transitive and V is R-persistent. Moreover, in transitive frames it holds that a valuation V is R-persistent if and only if for every propositional variable p, V ( p) is R-persistent. Let us call a valuation with this property R-persistent for the propositional variables. Thus we have the following completeness results. The class of models for VPL considered by Visser is the class of transitive Kripke models with a valuation R-persistent for the variables. He proved that VPL is exactly the local consequence relation defined by this class of models. Proof Because (N) is a rule of wK σ (DT 1 ) we have { n → ϕ : n ∈ ω, ϕ ∈ } wK σ (DT 1 ) ψ iff wK σ (DT 1 ) ψ. Therefore, by Proposition 8.10, we obtain the desired conclusion. Now we turn to the study of the logic wK σ (DT 1 , MP), the logic defined by the Gentzen calculus wK σ (DT 1 ) augmented with the modus ponens rule. First we observe that the logics wK σ (DT 1 , MP) and wK σ (DT 1 ) + (MP) are equal.
Proposition 8.12
The logics wK σ (DT 1 , MP) and wK σ (DT 1 ) + (MP) are equal.
Proof Using Theorem 8.8 it can be seen that if ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n wK σ (DT 1 ) ψ then for every formula δ, δ → ϕ 1 , . . . , δ → ϕ n wK σ (DT 1 ) δ → ψ. Then, using a standard argument it can be proved that (DT 1 ) holds for wk σ (DT 1 ) + (MP), namely, that if ϕ, ψ wK σ (DT 1 )+(MP) δ, then ϕ wK σ (DT 1 )+(MP) ψ → δ. This implies that wk σ (DT 1 , MP) = wK σ (DT 1 ) + (MP).
Proposition 8.13
The relation R c of the canonical model of the logic wK σ (DT 1 , MP) is reflexive. Moreover, R c = ⊆.
Proof Assume ϕ → ψ ∈ and ϕ ∈ . By (MP), ψ ∈ . Therefore R c . We conclude that R c is reflexive. Moreover, we know that R c is included in the inclusion relation. Assume now that ⊆ . If ϕ → ψ ∈ and ϕ ∈ , since ϕ → ψ ∈ too, by (MP), ψ ∈ . Hence R c . Thus, R c = ⊆.
Using the above results this proposition has the following consequence. Since, by Theorem 8.14(2), wK σ (DT 1 , MP) is precisely intuitionistic logic, we obtain that the class of models W, R, V with R reflexive and V R-persistent is a sound and complete semantics for Intuitionistic logic too. To conclude we state the result proved by Suzuki, Wolter, and Zakharyashev on the non-protoalgebraicity of VPL.
Theorem 8.17
The logic wk σ (DT 1 ) (i.e., VPL) is non-protoalgebraic.
Proof The matrices in the proof of Proposition 4.8 show that VPL is not protoalgebraic.
